Creating the Law, Creating the Facts, or Acting as Judge
A draft paper last updated January 22, 2021 by Earl Dexter Smith
In 1976, the State of Indiana's General Assembly, confronted overcrowded, inhumane living conditions in an effort to develop a new criminal justice system. Public Law No. 148, also known as, Indiana Code 35-50-6-1 became effective October 1977. It was enacted during a summer of 1977 'special session'. The 93-94 session of the Indiana General Assembly extended the provision(s) of IC 35-50-6-1 or Public Law No. 148. Indiana has made some welcomed changes to its criminal justice system, yet one can not be naive to think a constitutional system is not going to be met with resistance. The previous flawed system was only an unlawful ordinary way of operating that was made official.
It takes at least two to ambush the executive branch of the government. In this case two law schools, two state legislatures, and thereafter two of who, or whatever. In order for this unconstitutional system to work, there has two be at least two states
with the same flaw. In this case Indiana, and California with the same Public Law 148. This law was enacted to justify opposition to equal employment rights, and immigration. Immigration is directly linked to this flawed criminal justice system by the use of the term parole, instead of probation.
After the enactment of this unconstitutional state system, Congress sealed off the Civil Rights Act with the United States Magistrates Act, a court without injunctive authority. A federal, or public attorney defending fraud, in a civil, or private proceeding is not constitutionally protected. This has become routine, after going on for over four decades. The code was created to escape private liability when one shouldn't.
At first thought, the code appears to provide for a test or trial period for persons released from imprisonment. Before examining the code, an understanding of the terms parole, probation, legislate, and adjudicate must be made. The terms parole, and probation are understood to be trial periods. The difference in the two terms are the source of their grant. Probation is granted by the local courts, (Plotner v. State, 1986). Parole is granted by the executive. Probation is granted by the judiciary. Parole is granted by the governor (Swart v. State, 1986).
The central difference between legislate, and adjudicate is clear. To legislate translates to creating the law, or policy, and to adjudicate centers around creating the facts, or evidence (Koch, Jordan & Murphy, 2010). When the legislature creates law or policy, it is legislating. In these instances, the type of facts which inform the tribunal’s legislative judgment are called legislative facts.
Legislative facts, in more instances, help the legislature determine the subject of law and policy. Also, these type facts support the legislature in deciding what course of action to take. For example, as a result of empirical testing, it decides that a person with a blood level of .02 or more is considered intoxicated (Koch, Jordan & Murphy, 2010). Similarly, when a judge, court, or agency finds that more men should remove their hats while in its courtroom, it too has created the law or policy for that particular court, or agency.
On the other hand, when a court or agency finds who did what, where, when, how, and with what basis, it is creating the facts. Put another way, the creation of facts, as it relates to a judge, court, or agency is the application of the law in the process of deciding. These type facts usually go to the judge, or jury to assist them in reaching a decision. They relate to the persons
involved in the dispute, their actions, their belongings, and their enterprises (Koch, Jordan & Murphy 2010).
More persons would like to be represented by someone they are in agreement with, in proceedings, or transactions concerning constitutionally protected property, liberty, and life interests. Along a similar type of reasoning that facts, or evidence is needed for a claim, or defense, more persons would like to represented by someone they are in agreement with, when it comes to facts, or evidence for their conclusions.
The Norris La Guardia Act is an anti-injunction statute that was enacted to keep employers from filing an injunction in federal courts to prevent laborers, or employees from striking, and other constitutional activity (Forbath, 2003). Since 1976 this Act is
incorrectly used to give some federal officials a Home rule, or Commerce Clause claim. For example, if a person is on federal property not committing a crime, the Norris La Guardia Act would be used to charge the person with trespassing when they aren’t, have local officials arrest the person, and bring the person before a local, or county court.
Article 4 Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution, for instance, requires all penal laws receive uniform operation throughout the state. These actions are an unlawful attempt on a federal level to be local, or special lawyer where the Indiana, and other legislatures have decided that an ordinary law must be applicable (Sablica v. City, 1976). On a federal civil rights consideration this would be analogous to retaliation.
In other words, the Norris La Guardia Act is incorrectly used to exempt a some federal officials from disclosing the factual basis for their claim. To say it differently, some ederal officials are incorrectly using the Act to exempt themselves from having facts, or evidence, and later claiming State’s rights, Home rule, or the Commerce Clause. Conversely, on local and state level these acts would be analogous to tortuous interference, induction, or a waiver of something unthinkably worse than attorney client. This type thinking occurs because ordinarily one would subconsciously be expecting these individuals to be protecting instead of injuring, exploiting, or causing harm.
The deciding factor of whether an act is the practice of law is not where the act is committed, but the type of act committed (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 1937). In essence, these actions are an incorrect coercion of state, or local officials to follow misrepresentations of the Commerce Clause. Concerning Home Rule, these actions unlawfully include all other courts of a state, while in regards to states' rights these actions unlawfully include all other state Supreme Courts.
References
1. 721 P. 2d 810, 812 (1986).
2. 720 P. 2d 1265, 1270 (1986).
3. Koch, Charles H., Jordan, William S., Murphy, Richard W. (2010). Administrative Law: Cases and
Materials.
4. Forbath, William E. (2003). "Injunctions, Labor." Dictionary of American History. Ed. Stanley I. Kutler. 3rd ed. Vol. 4. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003. 360-361. Gale Virtual Reference Library.
http://ezproxy.ilibrary.org/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do? id=GALE%7CCX3401802088&v=2.1&u=imcpl_indy&it=r&p=&sw=w&asid=983508f4937b0f17ca6231ebaa4a8dcc
5. 264 Ind. 271, 342 N. E. 2d 853 (1976).
6. 366 Ill. 346, at 357, 8 N.E. 2d 941 (1937).
© COPYRIGHT 2011
Disclaimer: This paper is not intended to be legal advice. For a legal problem, the assistance of a lawyer is recommended.
A draft paper last updated January 22, 2021 by Earl Dexter Smith
In 1976, the State of Indiana's General Assembly, confronted overcrowded, inhumane living conditions in an effort to develop a new criminal justice system. Public Law No. 148, also known as, Indiana Code 35-50-6-1 became effective October 1977. It was enacted during a summer of 1977 'special session'. The 93-94 session of the Indiana General Assembly extended the provision(s) of IC 35-50-6-1 or Public Law No. 148. Indiana has made some welcomed changes to its criminal justice system, yet one can not be naive to think a constitutional system is not going to be met with resistance. The previous flawed system was only an unlawful ordinary way of operating that was made official.
It takes at least two to ambush the executive branch of the government. In this case two law schools, two state legislatures, and thereafter two of who, or whatever. In order for this unconstitutional system to work, there has two be at least two states
with the same flaw. In this case Indiana, and California with the same Public Law 148. This law was enacted to justify opposition to equal employment rights, and immigration. Immigration is directly linked to this flawed criminal justice system by the use of the term parole, instead of probation.
After the enactment of this unconstitutional state system, Congress sealed off the Civil Rights Act with the United States Magistrates Act, a court without injunctive authority. A federal, or public attorney defending fraud, in a civil, or private proceeding is not constitutionally protected. This has become routine, after going on for over four decades. The code was created to escape private liability when one shouldn't.
At first thought, the code appears to provide for a test or trial period for persons released from imprisonment. Before examining the code, an understanding of the terms parole, probation, legislate, and adjudicate must be made. The terms parole, and probation are understood to be trial periods. The difference in the two terms are the source of their grant. Probation is granted by the local courts, (Plotner v. State, 1986). Parole is granted by the executive. Probation is granted by the judiciary. Parole is granted by the governor (Swart v. State, 1986).
The central difference between legislate, and adjudicate is clear. To legislate translates to creating the law, or policy, and to adjudicate centers around creating the facts, or evidence (Koch, Jordan & Murphy, 2010). When the legislature creates law or policy, it is legislating. In these instances, the type of facts which inform the tribunal’s legislative judgment are called legislative facts.
Legislative facts, in more instances, help the legislature determine the subject of law and policy. Also, these type facts support the legislature in deciding what course of action to take. For example, as a result of empirical testing, it decides that a person with a blood level of .02 or more is considered intoxicated (Koch, Jordan & Murphy, 2010). Similarly, when a judge, court, or agency finds that more men should remove their hats while in its courtroom, it too has created the law or policy for that particular court, or agency.
On the other hand, when a court or agency finds who did what, where, when, how, and with what basis, it is creating the facts. Put another way, the creation of facts, as it relates to a judge, court, or agency is the application of the law in the process of deciding. These type facts usually go to the judge, or jury to assist them in reaching a decision. They relate to the persons
involved in the dispute, their actions, their belongings, and their enterprises (Koch, Jordan & Murphy 2010).
More persons would like to be represented by someone they are in agreement with, in proceedings, or transactions concerning constitutionally protected property, liberty, and life interests. Along a similar type of reasoning that facts, or evidence is needed for a claim, or defense, more persons would like to represented by someone they are in agreement with, when it comes to facts, or evidence for their conclusions.
The Norris La Guardia Act is an anti-injunction statute that was enacted to keep employers from filing an injunction in federal courts to prevent laborers, or employees from striking, and other constitutional activity (Forbath, 2003). Since 1976 this Act is
incorrectly used to give some federal officials a Home rule, or Commerce Clause claim. For example, if a person is on federal property not committing a crime, the Norris La Guardia Act would be used to charge the person with trespassing when they aren’t, have local officials arrest the person, and bring the person before a local, or county court.
Article 4 Section 22 of the Indiana Constitution, for instance, requires all penal laws receive uniform operation throughout the state. These actions are an unlawful attempt on a federal level to be local, or special lawyer where the Indiana, and other legislatures have decided that an ordinary law must be applicable (Sablica v. City, 1976). On a federal civil rights consideration this would be analogous to retaliation.
In other words, the Norris La Guardia Act is incorrectly used to exempt a some federal officials from disclosing the factual basis for their claim. To say it differently, some ederal officials are incorrectly using the Act to exempt themselves from having facts, or evidence, and later claiming State’s rights, Home rule, or the Commerce Clause. Conversely, on local and state level these acts would be analogous to tortuous interference, induction, or a waiver of something unthinkably worse than attorney client. This type thinking occurs because ordinarily one would subconsciously be expecting these individuals to be protecting instead of injuring, exploiting, or causing harm.
The deciding factor of whether an act is the practice of law is not where the act is committed, but the type of act committed (People ex rel. Chicago Bar Association v. Goodman, 1937). In essence, these actions are an incorrect coercion of state, or local officials to follow misrepresentations of the Commerce Clause. Concerning Home Rule, these actions unlawfully include all other courts of a state, while in regards to states' rights these actions unlawfully include all other state Supreme Courts.
References
1. 721 P. 2d 810, 812 (1986).
2. 720 P. 2d 1265, 1270 (1986).
3. Koch, Charles H., Jordan, William S., Murphy, Richard W. (2010). Administrative Law: Cases and
Materials.
4. Forbath, William E. (2003). "Injunctions, Labor." Dictionary of American History. Ed. Stanley I. Kutler. 3rd ed. Vol. 4. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 2003. 360-361. Gale Virtual Reference Library.
http://ezproxy.ilibrary.org/login?url=http://go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do? id=GALE%7CCX3401802088&v=2.1&u=imcpl_indy&it=r&p=&sw=w&asid=983508f4937b0f17ca6231ebaa4a8dcc
5. 264 Ind. 271, 342 N. E. 2d 853 (1976).
6. 366 Ill. 346, at 357, 8 N.E. 2d 941 (1937).
© COPYRIGHT 2011
Disclaimer: This paper is not intended to be legal advice. For a legal problem, the assistance of a lawyer is recommended.
